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FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS: 
WHO PUT THE HOLES IN 
“HOLISTIC”? 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA 
INTRODUCTION 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,1 the Supreme Court 
altered, in subtle but important ways, the constitutional principles 
governing race-conscious affirmative action programs at American 
universities. This Article charts the history of the Fisher litigation, 
examines the Supreme Court’s holding and its consequences, explores 
the factors that contributed to the deep skepticism held by a majority 
of the Justices on the Supreme Court to “holistic” race-conscious 
admissions programs, and reflects on the future of holistic admissions 
in American higher education. 
It may be tempting to dismiss Fisher as a “non-event” that avoided 
any genuine examination of the principles governing affirmative 
action in higher education, effectively maintaining the status quo.2 
Such a minimalist reading of Fisher, however, would be a mistake. 
Fisher did alter the law, by eliminating the substantial deference the 
Supreme Court had previously been willing to extend to university 
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 1.  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 2.  On September 27, 2013, the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of 
Justice and the United States Department of Education issued a letter to American college and 
university presidents providing “guidance” on Fisher that took the position that Fisher did not 
alter existing law. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to College and 
Univ. Presidents (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/letters/colleague-201309.html. Specifically, the letter notes that the Supreme Court 
affirmed that “colleges and universities have a compelling interest in achieving the educational 
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body and can lawfully pursue 
that interest in their admissions programs,” and that the educational benefits of diversity 
recognized by the Court “include cross-racial understanding and dialogue, the reduction of 
racial isolation, and the breaking down of racial stereotypes.” Id. 
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educators on whether race-conscious programs are necessary to 
achieve the benefits of a diverse student body. Fisher replaces that 
deference with a rigorous rendition of strict scrutiny equal protection 
review that will prove, in future cases, to exert a potent presumption 
against the validity of race-conscious affirmative action programs. The 
Supreme Court’s new skepticism is fueled by a deep suspicion on the 
part of a majority of the current Justices that the “holistic” approach 
to affirmative action admissions does not live up to its advertising. 
Fisher portends significant future restrictions on race-conscious 
affirmative action admissions programs—perhaps their full demise. 
American universities are themselves complicit in this demise, for 
having failed in the eyes of a majority of the Justices to convincingly 
“walk the walk” on holistic admissions, despite an exuberant tendency 
to “talk the talk.” 
Although the legal battles in Fisher, and in other challenges to 
affirmative action, will continue to play out in courts, those of us in 
higher education will do well to rethink our own commitments to 
genuinely holistic approaches to admissions, entirely aside from what 
the courts finally tell us we may or may not do. Authentically holistic 
admissions programs that treat students as more than mere numbers 
hold great promise for the nation, and for higher education. Yet, the 
Fisher litigation teaches that federal courts—including a majority of 
the Justices on the Supreme Court—may not be willing to accept, as a 
matter of deferential good faith, the claim by those in higher 
education that approaches to holistic admissions are, “on the street,” 
quite as idealistically holistic as advertised. Perhaps that is not such a 
bad thing. 
I. THE LEGAL BACKDROP TO THE FISHER LITIGATION 
Understanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher requires 
some historical context. This Part discusses the Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence leading up to Fisher and highlights the 
incremental development of race-conscious admissions policies by 
state universities in Texas. 
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A. Bakke 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke3 was a challenge to 
the affirmative action admissions program of the Medical School of 
the University of California at Davis, in which sixteen admissions 
seats at the Medical School were reserved for members of minority 
groups.4 The Supreme Court was sharply divided in the case, with six 
Justices issuing separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than four votes. Justice Lewis Powell was the man in the middle. His 
opinion controlled the outcome, and largely set the stage for the next 
three decades of affirmative action law and policy in American higher 
education.5 
Justice Powell’s fateful opinion in Bakke rejected a two-tiered 
approach to racial classifications, which would have distinguished 
between benign and invidious classifications.6 Powell insisted instead 
that all racial classifications be measured under the strict scrutiny test, 
though he at times used the phrase “most exacting scrutiny.”7 Powell 
thereby rejected the view that the Constitution was colorblind and 
that absolutely all racial classifications were invalid, without 
exception.8 
The Medical School proffered four justifications for its affirmative 
action program: (1) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally 
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical 
profession”; (2) “countering the effects of societal discrimination”; (3) 
“increasing the number of physicians who will practice in 
communities currently underserved”; and (4) “obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student 
 
 3.  438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 4.  Id. at 277–79. 
 5.  Id. at 269; see also Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a 
Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21, 23 (1979); John Jeffries, Bakke Revisted, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10 
(2003) (“Powell’s fifth vote rested on a narrower rationale and a more demanding standard of 
review. Even though no one shared Powell's position, it nevertheless ended up defining the kind 
of affirmative action that a majority of the Court was prepared to uphold.”).  
 6.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294–95 (“It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal 
protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of 
protection greater than that accorded others. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely 
against discrimination due to a two-class theory . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 7.  Id. at 300. 
 8.  Id. at 272 (“I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the 
portion of the court's judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in 
its admissions process must be reversed.”). 
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body.”9 Justice Powell rejected the first three justifications. He did 
accept as a constitutionally permissible “compelling interest,” 
however, the Medical School’s pursuit of educational benefits, formal 
and informal, that flow from a more diverse student body.10 Powell 
argued that an affirmative action program could pass constitutional 
muster if it used race as a flexible “plus factor” in admissions, 
employed a broad definition of diversity that included characteristics 
other than race, and avoided strict quotas or set-asides of the sort 
utilized by the Medical School.11 
Powell concluded that “it is not too much to say that the nation’s 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the 
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many 
peoples.”12 Arguing that the pursuit of a diverse student body was of 
“paramount importance” to the fulfillment of the university’s 
mission,13 Powell stated that “even at the graduate level, our tradition 
and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of 
diversity is substantial.”14 Even so, Powell held that in setting aside a 
specific number of minority seats, the Medical School violated the 
Equal Protection Clause: 
[T]he state interest that would justify consideration of race or 
ethnic background . . . is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, 
in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect 
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the 
remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. 
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses 
a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. 
Petitioner’s special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic 







 9.  Id. at 306. 
 10.  Id. at 312–21. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 313. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 315. 
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Holding up the Harvard admissions program as a foil, Justice 
Powell asserted that at Harvard, “ethnic background may be deemed 
a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the 
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available 
seats.”16 Although Justice Powell did not use the word “holistic” in his 
opinion, universities and subsequent judicial opinions would come to 
use the term as shorthand for the approach Justice Powell endorsed. 
B. Hopwood and the Texas Top Ten Percent Law 
In Hopwood v. Texas,17 decided in 1996, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that the University of Texas Law School’s race-
conscious admissions program was unconstitutional.18 Hopwood was a 
bold decision for its time. In the mid-1990s most American 
universities, public and private, had been using the holistic approach 
to race-conscious admissions approved by Justice Powell in Bakke. 
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit struck down the Texas Law School 
admissions program in an unflinching decision that held, first, that 
Justice Powell’s solo opinion was simply the vote of one Justice and 
not binding as precedent,19 and second, that it was not sound 
constitutional law.20 Most pointedly, the Fifth Circuit flatly rejected 
the argument that the pursuit of a diverse student body qualified as a 
compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the race-
conscious admissions program under strict scrutiny.21 Though 
technically binding only on the Texas Law School, Hopwood was 
interpreted by the Texas Attorney General as effectively banning 
race-conscious admissions programs in all of the state’s public 
universities and colleges, at all levels of higher education. 
Hopwood had a short shelf life. The Texas state legislature dealt 
the first blow by crafting an end-run around the decision in 1997 by 
 
 16.  Id. at 317. 
 17.  78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 18.  Id. at 955, 962. 
 19.  Id. at 944 (“[A]ny consideration of race . . . for the purpose of achieving a diverse 
student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell’s 
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority 
of the Court in Bakke or any other case.”). 
 20.  Id. at 944–48 (concluding that “the use of race to achieve a diverse student body, 
[even] as a proxy for permissible characteristics, simply cannot be a state interest compelling 
enough to meet the steep standard of strict scrutiny”). 
 21.  Id. at 945 (“In short, there has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than 
Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a 
compelling justification for governmental race-based discrimination.”). 
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passing “The Top Ten Percent Law.”22 This statute provided that any 
student finishing in the top ten percent of his or her high school class 
must be granted automatic admission to any Texas state university.23 
Although the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Hopwood remained the 
governing law in Texas, the impact of Hopwood was muted by the 
legislative enactment.24 
The Top Ten Percent Law was in a curious sense both race-neutral 
and race-based. On its surface it was entirely race-neutral, creating a 
reward for any student finishing in the top ten percent of his or her 
class. Yet race was indisputably the animating purpose behind the 
law.25 In operation it served, at least modestly, to enhance diversity at 
Texas public universities (including the University of Texas at Austin), 
because some Texas high schools were predominantly populated by 
students of only one race.26 The Rio Grande Valley, for example, is 
overwhelmingly Hispanic, and certain urban areas in large cities such 
as Dallas and Houston are overwhelmingly African-American.27 
Given that Texas contained a share of high schools that were almost 
entirely African-American, Hispanic, or Caucasian, the basic math of 
the Top Ten Percent Law was quite simple. In offering automatic 
admission to top-ten-percent students from each high school in the 
state, the diversity in the top ten percent pool, and by extension, the 
diversity in the entering college class at the University of Texas at 
Austin, would be enhanced. With some irony, the Top Ten Percent 
Law promoted diversity precisely because so much of the State of 
Texas was still de facto segregated.28 
 
 22.  TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2013).  
 23.  Id. § 51.803(a). 
 24.  See Gerald Torres, “Examining Diversity” in Education: Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. 
Bollinger: View from a Limestone Edge, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1600–01 (2003) (“The 
University of Texas has created a more racially, geographically, and socioeconomically diverse 
class, and it has expanded the number of feeder high schools yielding an academically successful 
student body.”). 
 25.  See Brief for the Respondent at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (No. 11-345) (“An acknowledged purpose of the law was to increase minority admissions 
given the loss of race-conscious admissions.” (citation omitted)). 
 26.  Texas public high schools are highly segregated in certain regions of the state. The 
predominance of public schools dominated by students from one racial group reflects the long-
standing segregated housing patterns that are common throughout the United States. See 
generally Rodney Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the 
1980s, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985); Rodney Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The 
Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 
1981 DUKE L.J. 891, 892 n.1 (1981).  
 27.  See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 25, at 8.  
 28.  See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, 
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C. Grutter and Gratz 
The second blow to Hopwood was judicial. In 2003, the Supreme 
Court rendered its bookend decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger29 and 
Gratz v. Bollinger.30 In Grutter, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, 
upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action 
admissions program.31 Justice O’Connor, writing for a five-Justice 
majority (comprised of Justices O’Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, 
and Souter), embraced Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke, sustaining 
as constitutionally legitimate the Michigan Law School’s aspiration to 
enroll a “critical mass” of minority students.32 The Michigan Law 
School’s admission committee focused on a combination of 
traditional indicia of academic ability, such as LSAT scores and 
undergraduate GPA, and a more flexible assessment of the applicant’s 
talents, experiences, and potential.33 The process involved weighing 
both “hard data” and “soft variables,” which included “the enthusiasm 
of the recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the 
quality of the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of 
undergraduate course selection.”34  
In so doing, the Michigan Law School sought to achieve a “mix of 
students with varying backgrounds and experiences who [could] 
respect and learn from one another.”35It aspired to “achieve diversity 
which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make 
a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.”36 The language of 
the Michigan Law School’s policy included both a broad conception 
of diversity not limited to race and ethnicity, and a special emphasis 
on racial and ethnic diversity.37 The policy thus acknowledged “many 
possible bases for diversity admissions,” and allowed substantial 
 
Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1817–19 (2004). 
 29.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 30.  539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 31.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44. 
 32.  Id. at 323–35. 
       33.    Id. at 314. 
 34.  Id. at 315. 
 35.  Id. at 314. In addition, the Michigan Law School considered letters of 
recommendation, a personal statement, and an essay describing what the applicant could 
contribute to life and diversity at the school. Id. at 315. 
 36.  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37.  Id. at 315–16 (“The policy does, however, reaffirm the Law School's longstanding 
commitment to . . . ‘racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students 
from groups which have been historically discriminated against, . . . who without this 
commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
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weight to be given in the admissions process to a wide array of 
experiences and backgrounds.38 Yet at the same time, the policy 
reaffirmed and entrenched the Michigan Law School’s commitment 
to the enrollment of a “critical mass” of racial or ethnic minority 
students.39 
Whereas the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood had argued that the 
diversity rationale embraced by Powell in Bakke had garnered only 
his one vote, now there were five votes.40 The majority in Grutter held 
that the Michigan Law School’s compelling interest in creating a 
diverse student body was being pursued in a constitutionally 
allowable manner. The admissions regime met strict scrutiny’s test of 
narrow tailoring—no quotas or set-asides were used, every student’s 
file was considered holistically and individually, and race was not an 
exclusive factor but simply one ingredient in a complex 
bouillabaisse.41 
Conversely, the Court in Gratz struck down the University of 
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program.42 Although the 
undergraduate program also sought a diverse student body, the 
admissions program for undergraduates appeared more mechanistic 
than holistic. Michigan’s undergraduate admissions system used a 
selection method under which every applicant from an “under-
represented” racial or ethnic minority group was automatically 
awarded twenty points of the one hundred needed to guarantee 
admission,43 rendering the program dangerously close to the sort of 
 
 38.  Id. at 316. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Commentators have often stressed the linkage between the Court’s opinion in Grutter 
and Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. See Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, 
Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 541, 548 (2003) (“Justice O'Connor quoted extensively from Justice Powell a 
whopping sixteen times. To endorse and cite [Bakke] and suggest independent agreement with 
it is one thing; to cannibalize all its key formulations suggests that the case is doing a great deal 
of the work.”); Susan Low Bloch, Looking Ahead: The Future of Affirmative Action, 52 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1507, 1513 (2003) (stating that the Court in Grutter “made the very significant decision 
that the University's desire to achieve diversity in its student body was in fact a compelling 
governmental interest, relying heavily on the reasoning of Justice Powell's lone opinion in 
Bakke”); Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1589, 1590–91 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices, 
Not Theory, Determine Constitutional Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 369 (2003) (“The bottom line 
is that the Court adhered to the position articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Bakke a quarter 
century ago: Diversity is a compelling interest in education and universities may use race as a 
factor to ensure diversity, but quotas or numerical quantification of benefits is impermissible.”). 
 41.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–44.  
 42.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003). 
 43.  Id. at 255 (“Under this new system, applicants could receive points for 
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quota disapproved by Justice Powell in Bakke.44 The undergraduate 
admissions program appeared to favor race for the sake of race alone, 
at least to the extent that in a quantifiable sense, points were explicitly 
awarded for membership in certain racial groups.45 
II. ABIGAIL FISHER’S SUIT AGAINST THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
In 2008, Abigail Fisher sued the University of Texas on the ground 
that she was denied undergraduate admission because she was white. 
She claimed that the University’s race-conscious admissions program 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 
Fisher was in the top twelve percent of her high school class, and 
thus could not benefit from Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law.47 But Fisher 
wanted to attend the University of Texas, so she applied for admission 
for one of the remaining seats in the freshman class.48 That year, 
approximately eighty-one percent of the incoming class would be 
filled by the system mandated by the Top Ten Percent Law.49 Thus, 
nineteen percent of the admission slots in the entering class were left 
open for students admitted outside the Ten Percent Law regime; 
Fisher could only compete for one of these remaining slots.50 To 
determine admissions for the remaining slots, the University 
 
underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or attendance at a high school 
with a predominantly underrepresented minority population, or underrepresentation in the unit 
to which the student was applying . . . .”). 
 44.  Interestingly, seven Justices saw no meaningful difference between the admissions 
policies at issue in Grutter and Gratz. Only Justices O’Connor and Breyer were in the majority 
in both cases. See Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 
244 n.104 (2004); cf. Ian Ayres & Sidney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After 
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518 (2007) (arguing that the Gratz policy was actually 
more narrowly tailored than the policy in Grutter). 
 45.  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274–75. 
 46.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 47.  See Second Amended Complaint at 3, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (No. 1:08-cv-00263-
SS) (“At the time of her application to UT Austin, Ms. Fisher was ranked 82 out of 674 students 
in her graduating class. Thus, Ms. Fisher was ranked in approximately the top 12 percent of her 
class . . . .”). 
 48.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (noting that Fisher 
applied to the University in 2008 and was rejected). 
 49.  Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 595.  
 50.  See id. at 596 (“The [Academic Index/Personal Achievement Indices] system is used to 
make admission decisions as to . . . non-Top Ten Percent Texas resident applicants . . . .”). The 
University’s individual academic programs admit students using the AI/API standards which 
combine two metrics: the Academic Index (AI), a combination of (1) high school GPA, (2) 
completion of the University’s required high school curriculum, (3) student’s extent of 
exceeding that curriculum, and (4) SAT Score; and the Personal Achievement Indices, 
reflecting scores on two essays and a “personal achievement score, representing a holistic 
evaluation of the applicant’s entire file.” Id. 
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incorporated race-conscious affirmative action policies, claiming to 
employ a holistic approach that included race as one “plus factor” in 
admissions, of the sort approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.51 
The manner in which Fisher framed her claim proved to be 
extremely important. She could have launched a frontal assault on 
Grutter, inviting the Supreme Court to repudiate it.52 Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter had suggested, after all, that the 
holding might not always be valid: “We expect that 25 years from now, 
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today.”53 Fisher might have tried to persuade the 
Court that twenty-five years should be reduced to ten, and that the 
experiment in Texas, with its Top Ten Percent Law, demonstrated that 
viable race-neutral alternatives could substitute for holistic race-
conscious affirmative action. The gamble with such a strategy would 
have been that with Justice O’Connor’s departure from the Court, 
there were now five votes poised to end affirmative action: Chief 
Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 
Fisher, however, chose a more constrained litigation strategy. 
Rather than staking her claim on the overruling of Grutter, she argued 
that the Texas admissions program violated the Equal Protection 
Clause even if Grutter remained good law.54 In essence, Fisher argued 
that because the Top Ten Percent Law already increased racial 
diversity at Texas, the University could not engage in what was akin to 
piling on—seeking yet additional diversity in rounding out the profile 





 51.  See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (noting the University’s method of employing race as a 
“plus” factor in the Personal Achievement Index is the “program at issue here”). 
 52.  Under this approach, she would have almost certainly lost in the district court and 
court of appeals, for those lower courts would have been without authority to disobey the 
standing law of the land. Yet she might still have framed her case in a manner that built a record 
and positioned her claim to urge the Supreme Court to overrule Grutter. 
 53.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 54.  See Brief for the Petitioner at 26–27, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (No. 11-345) (arguing that Grutter permits race to be used as a factor to achieve diversity 
but that the University’s asserted interests for considering race do not relate to the internal 
university experience, and are thus outside the scope permitted by Grutter). 
 55.  Id. at 34 (“With the Top 10% Law in operation then, UT was one of the most diverse 
public universities in the nation . . . . Neither Grutter nor any of this Court's other decisions 
authorizes ‘gratuitous racial preferences’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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For its part, Texas argued that the Top Ten Percent Law did not 
achieve sufficient diversity, either quantitatively or qualitatively, to 
satisfy its compelling interest in achieving a more diverse student 
body.56 Texas also argued that the admissions system it used was 
precisely what the Supreme Court had already approved in Grutter.57 
If Fisher was not challenging the ruling in Grutter, Texas reasoned, 
and if Texas was simply following Grutter’s roadmap, then it had done 
nothing unconstitutional.58 
III. THE ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Oral arguments in the Supreme Court are frequently parsed in 
news reports on the day or two after they take place. Typically, 
however, once a decision in a case is handed down, it is the decision 
itself, and not the briefs or oral arguments that preceded it, that is 
analyzed and examined. Thus, the exercise that follows is “extra-legal” 
in that it is offered for insight, not precedent. The oral argument in 
Fisher is worth parsing in some detail, for what it reveals about the 
majority opinion that later emerged, and for what it may tell us about 
the future of affirmative action after Fisher. 
Two phrases rose to special prominence during the oral argument 
in Fisher. The first was the term “critical mass” of minority students, 
the achievement of which came as a pre-approved goal for universities 
under Gutter.59 The second was the term “holistic admissions,” the 
shorthand commonly employed to describe the means approved in 
Grutter for the attainment of a critical mass.60 The oral argument in 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 25, at 9  (“Even with the top 10% law 
and UT's race-neutral diversity initiatives, African-American and Hispanic enrollment at best 
remained stagnant compared to the pre-Hopwood period.”). 
 57.  Id. at 11 (“The 2004 Proposal [challenged here] embraced the diversity interest that 
this Court found compelling in Grutter . . . .”). 
 58.  Id. at 38 (“UT has carefully followed this Court's teachings [in Grutter] to ensure that 
race is only one factor among many . . . . In petitioner's view, those instructions were not a road 
map to the safe harbor recognized by Bakke and Grutter, but a trap leading to 
unconstitutionality.”). 
 59.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. 
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Fisher Oral Argument]  (Bert Rein, counsel for 
Fisher) (“In order to satisfy Grutter, you first have to say that you are not just using race 
gratuitously, but it is in the interest of producing a critical mass of otherwise underrepresented 
students. . . . [T]he first question is, absent the use of race, would we be generating a critical 
mass.”). 
 60.  See, e.g., id. at 65 (Donald Verrilli, Solicitor General) (“There's no quota. Everyone 
competes against everyone else. Race is not a mechanical automatic factor. It's an holistic 
individualized consideration. And because of the way the process is structured, they do not 
monitor the racial composition on an ongoing basis.”). 
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Fisher, on its face, appeared to be an exercise in exploring whether the 
University of Texas admissions regime was faithful to those concepts 
within the confines of Grutter. Yet there was brightly visible an 
undercurrent of deep cynicism—so brightly visible as to not really be 
fairly called “beneath the surface” of the questions of the most 
skeptical Justices61—regarding the practical, moral, and legal 
legitimacy of the terms themselves. 
The anti-affirmative action Justices thus challenged the University 
of Texas and its defenders to articulate how and when the University 
would know that a “critical mass” of minority students had been 
enrolled.62 The oral argument is telling in its lack of any clear and crisp 
answer. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli gave the question a valiant 
try. In an elegant soliloquy, General Verrilli argued that America’s 
national “strength comes from people of different races, different 
creeds, different cultures, uniting in a commitment to freedom, and to 
more a perfect union.”63 This statement conjured the fervor of 
affirmative action’s most passionate proponents, in arguing that 
meaningful diversity—diversity that will genuinely enrich the 
educational experience of students at American universities, exposing 
students to a rainbow tapestry of fellow students from diverse races, 
ethnic groups, religions, cultures, nations, or life experiences— 
necessitates that there be a sufficient representation of each group in 
the mix to make the cross-exposure meaningful. To these arguments, 
Texas and its supporting amici also argued that a critical mass of 
representation is required to ward off the pernicious side-effects of 
tokenism and isolation.64 
 
 61.  I count as the most openly skeptical Justices Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, 
Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas was, as is his custom, quiet during the oral 
argument, though his past writings on affirmative action leave no doubt that he is a passionate 
opponent of affirmative action—as affirmed in his concurring opinion in Fisher itself, in which 
he again declared that he would overrule Grutter. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 62.  See, e.g., Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 20 (Alito, J.) (“Mr. Rein, do you 
understand what the University of Texas thinks is the definition of a critical mass? Because I 
don’t.”). 
 63.  Id. at 72. 
 64.  See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 25, at 41 (“[UT] based its determination 
that UT had not yet reached a critical mass in 2004 on hard data on minority admissions, 
enrollment and racial isolation at UT.”); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Society of American Law 
Teachers in Support of Respondents at 11, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (“Campus 
diversity permits more engaging and eye-opening classroom discussions, breaks down 
stereotypes, and prepares students to be leaders in an increasingly globalized and diverse 
business world. A diverse classroom also prevents racial isolation and tokenism, which can 
hinder learning environments for all students.”). 
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A palpable suspicion on the part of the skeptical Justices 
permeated the oral argument, however, as those Justices asked 
questions manifestly distrustful of both the conceptual coherence and 
practical execution of the goals of the University.65 Fisher’s advocate, 
Bert Rein, repeatedly argued that the University had abdicated its 
threshold responsibility under Grutter to define or establish a working 
target for obtaining a critical mass of minority students.66 Chief Justice 
Roberts questioned how the Supreme Court was supposed to perform 
its task of deciding whether the University’s pursuit of a critical mass 
of minority students was constitutional if the University would not or 
could not explain how it would know when it achieved a critical 
mass.67 
Additionally, the critical Justices were openly antagonistic to the 
University’s approach to gathering data about the profile of its 
student body. The University relied entirely on an applicant’s self-
description of racial or ethnic identity.68 Chief Justice Roberts was 
plainly disturbed by the lack of any objective standard to determine 
whether a student was appropriately classified. “I need to figure out 
exactly what these numbers mean,”69 the Chief Justice stated. “Should 
someone who is one-quarter Hispanic check the Hispanic box or 
some different box?”70 Pressing the point, the Chief Justice asked if it 
would violate the University’s honor code for someone who is one-
eighth Hispanic to check the Hispanic box.71 Justice Scalia pushed the 
fraction to 1/32nd.72 The University’s counsel ultimately conceded that 
the University made no effort to verify the declared racial 
identification of students, but sought refuge in the fact that it was not 
 
 65.  See, e.g., Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 46 (Roberts, C.J.) (“I understand my 
job, under our precedents, to determine if your use of race is narrowly tailored to a compelling 
interest. The compelling interest you identify is attaining a critical mass of minority students at 
the University of Texas, but you won't tell me what the critical mass is.”). 
 66.  Id. at 13. Bert Rein made this point repeatedly in his argument on Fisher’s behalf, 
including to questions posed by Justices Sotomayor and Scalia. See id. (Bert Rein, counsel for 
Fisher) (“[T]here was no effort in this case to establish even a working target for critical mass. . . 
. They just used words and they said we've got to do more. So they never answered the 
predicate question which Grutter asks: Absent the use of race, can we generate a critical 
mass?”). 
 67.  Id. at 32 (Roberts, C.J.) (“So how are we supposed to tell whether this plan is narrowly 
tailored to that goal?”). 
 68.  Id. at 32–34. 
 69.  Id. at 32. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 33. 
 72.  Id. at 35 (Scalia, J.) (“[D]id they require everybody to check a box or they have 
somebody figure out, oh, this person looks 1/32nd Hispanic, and that's enough?”). 
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alone. According to the University’s counsel, “no college in America,” 
including the Ivy Leagues and the Little Ivy Leagues,73 engaged in 
such verification.74 
The oral argument grew particularly poignant when the 
questioning turned to differences in the approach the University took 
toward students from different ethnic groups, most notably students 
of Asian descent. Fisher argued that the University effectively 
discriminated against Asian Americans, who did not receive any plus 
points for being members of an ethnic minority. The University 
argued that it did not need to prime the pump to enroll more students 
of Asian descent, as their numbers were already robust.75 Riding this 
point, Justice Alito asked the lawyer for the University, “How do you 
justify lumping together all Asian Americans?”76 Did the University 
believe, Justice Alito asked, that it had a critical mass of Filipino 
Americans?77 Cambodian Americans?78 
The questions asked by the skeptical Justices plainly exposed their 
concern that “critical mass” was largely a euphemism invoked to 
disguise what was really going on: the use of a numbers-driven quasi-
quota in which the actual goal, though never explicitly articulated, was 
to achieve a student body that roughly mirrored the demographics of 
the State of Texas. Such a regime would plainly be forbidden—it 
would constitute the very pursuit of race for the sake of race alone 
that Justice Powell had rejected as constitutionally impermissible in 
Bakke.79 
 
 73.  Id. at 33. 
 74.  Id. Additionally, Justice Scalia, exploring the granular texture of the critical mass 
concept, asked whether the critical mass determination should be made in reference to the 
“school at large,” or rather “class by class.” Id. at 34. The University’s counsel stated that the 
University only asserted a compelling interest in the diversity of its student body as a whole, and 
not classroom by classroom. Id.  
 75.  See id. at 29 (Bert Rein, counsel for Fisher) (“They say, we don't worry about Asians, 
there are a lot of Asians, it's a demographic measure, which is a forbidden measure. They are in 
excess of their share of the Texas population.”). 
 76.  Id. at 52. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2424 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Attaining diversity for its own sake is a nonstarter. As even Grutter recognized, 
the pursuit of diversity as an end is nothing more than impermissible ‘racial balancing.’”). The 
University insisted that it had not adopted such a simplistic system designed to achieve racial 
balance, notwithstanding questions asking whether this was really so. Fisher Oral Argument, 
supra note 59, at 39–40 (Alito, J.) (“Is the critical mass for the University of Texas dependent on 
the breakdown of the population of Texas?”). Justice Alito, for example, asked pointedly 
whether the definition of critical mass in Texas would be different from the definition in 
neighboring New Mexico: “But would 3 percent be enough in New Mexico, your bordering 
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The most telling moment in the oral argument surrounded a 
hypothetical. Counsel for the University was drawing a comparison 
between the results obtained under the Top Ten Percent Law, in which 
minority students “tend to come from segregated, racially-identifiable 
schools,”80 and the characteristics of minority students who are 
admitted under the holistic approach to admissions.81 In its principal 
brief, the University went to great lengths to explain how the minority 
students admitted under holistic review are generally more 
academically qualified than the minority students admitted under the 
Top Ten Percent Law: 
African-American and Hispanic students admitted through 
holistic review are, on average, more likely than their top 10% 
counterparts to have attended an integrated high school; are less 
likely to be the first in their families to attend college; tend to have 
more varied socioeconomic backgrounds; and, on average, have 
higher SAT scores than their top-10% counterparts.82 
These more qualified students, the University argued, have great 
potential to serve as a “bridge” for promoting cross-racial 
understanding, which in turn might help break down racial 
stereotypes—stereotypes that the University argued are often 
reinforced by the results achieved under the Top Ten Percent Law.83 
The University in its brief then posed a hypothetical: 
The African-American or Hispanic child of successful 
professionals in Dallas who has strong SAT scores and has 
demonstrated leadership ability in extracurricular activities but 
falls in the second decile of his or her high school class (or attends 
an elite private school that does not rank) cannot be admitted 
under the top 10% law. Petitioner’s position would forbid UT from 
considering such a student’s race in holistic review as well, even 
though the admission of such a student could help dispel 
stereotypical assumptions (which actually may be reinforced by 
the top 10% plan) by increasing diversity within diversity.84 
This hypothetical drew fire in the oral argument. Should such an 
applicant be the beneficiary of racial “plus points” in the admissions 
process? What all the Justices surely knew was that American 
 
state, where the African American population is around 2 percent?” Id. at 48. 
 80.  Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 42.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 25, at 33–34.  
 83.  Id. at 34. 
 84.  Id. 
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universities typically perceive such an applicant as highly desirable. 
The brief argued such students tend to be heavily recruited because 
they are often academically strong students who tend to promote 
cross-racial understanding and break down stereotypes. Even so, there 
is a more cynical narrative: that admission of such students improves 
both a university’s diversity and academic profiles, enhancing its 
rankings and prestige. When the “privileged Dallas student” 
hypothetical came up in the oral argument, Justice Alito lamented: “I 
thought that the whole purpose of affirmative action was to help 
students who come from underprivileged backgrounds.”85 The 
University, Justice Alito complained, was making the claim that the 
Top Ten Percent Law did not admit enough African-American or 
Hispanic students from privileged backgrounds, an argument that 
Justice Alito found deeply troubling.86 
When counsel for the University responded that the Court had 
approved this practice in Grutter and in Bakke, Justice Kennedy, who 
would emerge as the author of the Fisher majority opinion, made a 
statement that proved highly prescient: “So what you’re saying is that 
what counts is race above all.”87 Riding over the advocate’s denial, 
Justice Kennedy insisted that this was the necessary conclusion to be 
drawn from Texas’s answer to Justice Alito’s questions. “You want 
underprivileged of a certain race and privileged of a certain race,” 
Kennedy observed. “So that’s race.”88 
VI. A CLOSE ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN 
FISHER 
A. Fisher’s Three Key Questions 
At least as measured by the vote, Fisher was a surprise to many. 
The decision was seven–to–one, with only Justice Ginsburg 
dissenting.89 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and 
 
 85.  Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 59, at 43. 
 86.  Id. at 44 (Alito, J.) (questioning whether a minority applicant, whose parents may both 
have graduate degrees and earn income that puts the family in the top one percent of earners in 
the country, “deserve[s] a leg-up against . . . an Asian or a white applicant whose parents are 
absolutely average in terms of education and income”). 
 87.  Id. at 45. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Because Justice Kagan had participated in earlier stages in the litigation while serving 
as Solicitor General in the early years of the administration of President Obama, she recused 
herself from the case in the Supreme Court. 
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Sotomayor.90 Justices Scalia and Thomas, though joining in the 
opinion of Justice Kennedy, also wrote concurring opinions.91 
To clearly define what Fisher portends, it is useful to tease out the 
three critical and distinct issues addressed in the case. First, in 
applying the compelling governmental interest requirement of the 
first prong of the strict scrutiny test, may universities continue to rely 
on the goal of “diversity,” defined to include overt consideration of 
race and ethnicity, as a compelling governmental interest?92 Second, in 
applying the narrow tailoring requirement of the second prong of 
strict scrutiny, what level of deference must courts show to a 
university’s decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions program, as 
opposed to a race-neutral alternative?93 Third, in applying the narrow 
tailoring requirement of the second prong of strict scrutiny, what level 
of deference must courts show to a university’s decisions regarding 
the specific elements of its particular race-conscious admissions 
program?94 Each question will be explored in turn. 
1. The Status of “Diversity” as a Compelling Interest 
The answer to the first of the three questions posed above—
whether universities may continue to rely on “diversity,” defined to 
include race and ethnicity, as a compelling governmental interest—is: 
“Yes, but only for the time being, and stay tuned for further 
developments.” The Court in Fisher accepted diversity as a compelling 
interest only because Fisher chose not to frontally assault this aspect 
of Grutter.95 But there is language in Fisher clearly signaling the 
Court’s willingness to revisit this issue, and also clearly signaling the 
Court’s suspicion that the invocation of diversity by American 
universities may be a sleight-of-hand, a euphemism disguising what 
may really be going on—the pursuit of the unconstitutional goal of 
 
 90.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013). 
 91.  Id. at 2422. 
 92.  See id. at 2419 (“There is disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the 
principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in diversity.”). 
 93.  See id at 2419–20 (recognizing, on the one hand, that the University’s academic 
judgment identifying diversity as “integral to its mission” warrants some judicial deference, but 
cautioning, on the other hand, that a court must engage in “a careful judicial inquiry into 
whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications”). 
 94.  Id. at 2420 (stating that the University receives no deference with respect to the 
question of whether “the means chosen to achieve diversity are narrowly tailored to [the] goal 
[of diversity in the student body]”). 
 95.  See id. at 2419 (“[T]he parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of 
Grutter’s holding.”). 
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racial balancing for its own sake.96 
Justice Kennedy’s seven-Justice majority opinion, as well as the 
concurrences of Justices Scalia and Thomas, revealed the significance 
of Fisher’s strategic decision to refrain from asking the Supreme 
Court to overrule Grutter. Justice Scalia’s short concurrence noted 
that though he continued to adhere to the views he expressed in 
Grutter, that a university’s interest in the educational benefits of 
diversity could not justify racial preferences in university admissions, 
Fisher had not asked the Court to overrule Grutter. In that posture, he 
fully joined the majority opinion.97 Justice Thomas, in a much longer 
and more impassioned concurrence, also openly declared that he 
would vote to overrule Grutter.98 
If Fisher’s decision not to challenge Grutter took the Court off the 
hook, however, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion contained many 
signals as to where the Court would likely go if it were on the hook. In 
roundly criticizing the good faith standard invoked by the Fifth 
Circuit,99 the Fisher Court conspicuously invoked the long line of 
equal protection cases treating racial classifications as inherently 
odious and suspect.100 Moreover, despite the fact that Fisher’s lawyers 
 
 96.  The Court relied on two cases to suggest that diversity as a justification for the use of 
race in college admissions remains suspect. It began by emphasizing that a university’s good 
faith in using race as a factor in admissions does not operate as a shield, because “the mere 
recitation of a benign or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no 
weight.” Id. at 2421 (quoting City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that “[t]he analysis and level of scrutiny applied to 
determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the objective 
appears acceptable. . . . While the validity and importance of the objective may affect the 
outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself does not change.” Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97.  Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 98.  Id. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would overrule Grutter and hold that the 
University’s admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause because the University 
has not put forward a compelling interest that could possibly justify racial discrimination.”). 
 99.  The Court criticized the Fifth Circuit because “rather than perform this searching 
examination, [it] held petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s] decision to 
reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.’” Id. at 2420 (majority 
opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 
(5th Cir. 2011)). “These expressions of the controlling standard are at odds with Grutter’s 
command that all racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing 
court under strict scrutiny.” Id. at 2421 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100.  Id. at 2419 (“[A]dditional guidance may be found in the Court's broader equal 
protection jurisprudence which applies in this context. ‘Distinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people,’ . . . and therefore ‘are 
contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect[]’ . . . .” (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 
528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954))). That the Court cited to 
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did not seek an outright overruling of the Bakke/Grutter diversity 
rationale, there were hints in Justice Kennedy’s opinion that 
continued adherence to that rationale could be very much in play. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion included this obscure sentence: “We take 
those cases as given for purposes of deciding this case.” 101 If this was 
not damning by faint praise, it was at the least signaling by faint 
phrase. Note the careful wording: The Court did not say “we reaffirm 
those cases.” Rather, the Court chose a more cramped, cryptic 
wording, stating that it would simply “take” the cases “as given for the 
purposes of deciding this case,” leaving open the possibility that the 
Court would not take those cases as given in deciding future cases. 
2. The Status of Deference on Issues of Narrow Tailoring 
The appropriate role of deference to the educational judgments of 
universities was in play on two levels in Fisher. The more important 
issue was whether to defer to universities on the threshold question of 
whether race-conscious admissions practices are necessary at all.102 
The Fisher Court’s response to this question is not entirely plain. The 
soundest reading of Fisher, in my view, is that the Court no longer 
approves of deference to universities on any aspect of the application 
of the strict scrutiny test to race-conscious affirmative action 
programs, including the threshold question of whether they are 
necessary at all. 
This question, though it falls under the rubric of the narrow 
tailoring requirement, is of course very closely connected to the 
question of whether the pursuit of diversity should remain cognizable 
as a compelling governmental interest. Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law 
raised the possibility, however, that even if the pursuit of diversity is 
not decommissioned as a compelling interest, a university might still 
be unable to justify resort to race-conscious admissions policies to 
achieve the diverse student body it seeks. This was the approach 
Justice Kennedy, the key swing vote in the public school integration 
 
these cases highlights the general antagonism to race-conscious thinking that has dominated the 
thought of the Court’s most vocal opponents of affirmative action. See Jed Rubenfeld, 
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (noting that “the entire set of arguments” 
most commonly invoked by the Justices, “both for and against [affirmative action], is in fact 
constitutionally irrelevant”).  
 101.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417. 
 102.  See id. at 2420 (“Narrow tailoring also requires that the reviewing court verify that it is 
‘necessary’ for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.” (quoting 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978))).  
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cases,103 took in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,104 in which he 
supported the educational interests of school districts in achieving 
more racially balanced schools, but ruled they must pursue that goal 
without using race-conscious measures.105 
In determining how best to interpret Fisher on this threshold race-
conscious versus race-neutral point, it is helpful to begin with how the 
Court interpreted the Fifth Circuit ruling in the case. The Court found 
the Fifth Circuit had wrongly held the University of Texas to a 
standard less rigorous than traditional strict scrutiny, requiring only 
that the University demonstrate that its decision to reintroduce race 
as a factor in admissions was made “in good faith.”106 
This was a fair reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, but by no 
means a necessary one. The Fifth Circuit’s legal analysis opened, for 
example, with an extensive discussion of the strict scrutiny test it 
claimed to be applying, and went out of its way to insist that the rigor 
with which strict scrutiny must be applied is no less strict within the 
special circumstances of higher education.107 Yet, its invocation of 
strict scrutiny did indeed seem watered down by its simultaneous 
insistence that the University was entitled to deference in its 
judgments, that what Grutter required was simply a good-faith 
consideration by the University of race-neutral alternatives, and that 
the University was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it had 
indeed acted in good faith.108 
 
 103.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 104.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 105.  Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he idea that if race is the problem, 
race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward,” 
and that if this seems to frustrate “the Equal Protection Clause[,] it simply reflects the duality of 
our history and our attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against 
it”). The plurality opinion in Parents Involved, written by Chief Justice Roberts, went beyond 
Justice Kennedy’s position, adopting what was essentially a colorblind position, ending with the 
declaration: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.” Id. at 748 (plurality opinion). That statement echoed a similar expression made 
by Professor William Van Alstyne many years earlier. See William Van Alstyne, Rites of 
Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809–10 (1979) 
(“[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible 
commitment never to tolerate in one's own life—or in the life or practices of one's 
government—the differential treatment of other human beings by race.”). 
 106.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.  
 107.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 108.  Id. at 231–32 (“Rather than second-guess the merits of the University's decision, . . . we 
instead scrutinize the University's decisionmaking process to ensure that its decision to adopt a 
race-conscious admissions policy followed from the good faith consideration Grutter requires. 
We presume the University acted in good faith, [which] Appellants are free to rebut.”) 
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The Fifth Circuit cannot be too severely condemned for 
superimposing the good faith test, along with a presumption of good 
faith, on its strict scrutiny review, for there was in fact language in 
Grutter—language drawn from Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke— 
seeming to endorse such a test. As Grutter put it: 
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a 
diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a 
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper 
institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a 
university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”109 
The Fifth Circuit concluded its analysis by again quoting the standard 
articulated in Grutter, holding that “we cannot say that under the 
circumstances before us UT breached its obligation to undertake a 
‘serious, good faith consideration’ before resorting to race-conscious 
measures.”110 
The Fifth Circuit clearly thought it was doing what Grutter 
instructed it to do—but the Supreme Court in Fisher was adamant 
that the Fifth Circuit got Grutter exactly wrong.111 Strict scrutiny, the 
Fisher Court instructed, “does require a court to examine with care, 
and not defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race-neutral alternatives.’”112 This enormously important 
passage in Fisher, which includes the word “not” smack dab in the 
center, turns out to not be in Grutter! The Fisher opinion does 
accurately quote Grutter’s use of the phrase “serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.” The clear 
insistence that courts must not defer to that good-faith consideration 
is Fisher’s new invention. It does not come from Grutter. What Grutter 
actually said on point is only this: “Narrow tailoring does, however, 
require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”113 
There is no “not” in that sentence. 
The Supreme Court, of course, is master of its own precedents, and 
free to adjust those precedents as it deems wise. My point here is 
simply this: It would seriously under-read and trivialize Fisher to see 
 
 109.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–19 (1978)). 
 110.  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 246. 
 111.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“[The Fifth Circuit’s] expressions of the controlling standard 
are at odds with Grutter’s command . . . .”). 
 112.  Id. at 2420 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339) (emphasis added). 
 113.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
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the case as merely reversing and remanding the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision for failing to apply the law as laid down in Grutter. The 
opinion did much more. Fisher is a deliberate adjustment to Grutter, 
an adjustment that goes to the heart of one of Grutter’s analytic 
mainstays: its standard of deference to the educational judgments of 
universities. That deference, so important to the Powell opinion in 
Bakke and the majority opinion of Justice O’Connor in Grutter, has 
been repudiated in Fisher.114 
Indeed, the Fisher Court went out of its way to distinguish 
between those genuinely academic judgments on which courts 
appropriately defer to universities, and those judgments that implicate 
constitutional standards on which courts must not defer.115 The Court 
in Fisher noted Grutter’s mandate that judges defer to the educational 
judgment of university educators regarding the benefits that flow 
from a diverse student body: “Grutter concluded that the decision to 
pursue ‘the educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity,’ that the University deems integral to its mission is, in 
substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not 
complete, judicial deference is proper under Grutter.”116 Yet after this 
bone is tossed, the opinion goes on to recite what the Court really 
feels—that universities should not receive the deference to which they 







 114.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as 
to education includes the selection of its student body.”); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“The 
Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is 
one to which we defer.”).    
 115.  See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  The Court immediately limits the amount of deference owed to universities, 
emphasizing that “[a] court, of course, should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled 
explanation for the academic decision.” Id. It notes that “[t]here is disagreement about whether 
Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling 
interest in diversity,” and it proceeds to qualify the way a university may define diversity. Id. 
(“A university is not permitted to define diversity as ‘some specified percentage of a particular 
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.’ ‘That would amount to outright racial 
balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 307)). 
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Tellingly, on this point, the Supreme Court appeared to be dealing 
with two questions of deference—on whether race-conscious 
programs are required at all, and on the merits of a particular 
program’s actual design: 
[Though] a court can take account of a university’s experience and 
expertise in adopting or rejecting certain admissions 
processes[,] . . . as the Court said in Grutter, it remains at all 
times . . . the Judiciary’s obligation to determine[] that admissions 
processes “ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual 
and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the 
defining feature of his or her application.” Narrow tailoring also 
requires that the reviewing court verify that it is “necessary” for a 
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of 
diversity.118 
Driving home this point, the Fisher Court instructed that if a race-
neutral alternative will accomplish the University’s goals roughly as 
well as a race-conscious system, the race-neutral alternative must be 
chosen.119 
Perhaps because the Court appreciated that the lower courts in 
the litigation and the litigants themselves may have been somewhat 
blind-sided by the Court’s abrupt instruction that courts must not 
defer to universities’ good-faith judgments that race-based admissions 
programs are necessary, the Fisher Court chose to simply remand the 
case for further proceedings under its newly-clarified standards. It 
observed that “fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard the 
case requires that it be remanded so that the admissions process can 
be considered and judged under a correct analysis.”120 
That Fisher should be understood as a major shift away from 
deference to universities, portending the demise of Grutter, is further 
evidenced by the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg. Her opinion 
was a vigorous defense of both Grutter and the Texas admissions 
system.121 What is striking is not that Justice Ginsburg would author 
 
 118.  Id. at 2419–20 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333, 337). 
 119.  Id. at 2440 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-
neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If ‘a nonracial 
approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative 
expense,’ . . . then the university may not consider race.” (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986))). 
 120.  Id. at 2421. 
 121.  Justice Ginsburg defended the University’s admissions system, noting that “[t]he 
University has steered clear of a quota system like the one struck down in Bakke,” and that “[it] 
has taken care to follow the model approved by the Court in Grutter.” Id. at 2432–33 (Ginsburg, 
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such a dissent, for her views on the matter are well known.122 What is 
striking—and particularly noteworthy for predicting the future of 
race-based admissions programs—is that not a single other Justice on 
the Court joined her. 
Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent: “Texas’ percentage plan was 
adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods and schools front and 
center stage.”123 To the extent that Fisher’s claim was distilled in the 
notion that race-conscious plans were not needed because solutions 
such as the Top Ten Percent Law demonstrated how race-neutral 
plans would work just as well, Justice Ginsburg argued that “[i]t is 
race consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives such plans.”124 
Further elaborating, Justice Ginsburg chided: 
The notion that Texas’ Top Ten Percent Law is race neutral calls to 
mind Professor Thomas Reed Powell’s famous statement: “If you 
think that you can think about a thing inextricably attached to 
something else without thinking of the thing which it is attached to, 
then you have a legal mind.”125 
Only such a legal mind, Justice Ginsburg quipped, “could conclude 
that an admissions plan specifically designed to produce racial 
diversity is not race conscious.”126 Whether one regards Justice 
Ginsburg’s point here as persuasive or not, there is surely significance 
in the fact that she, and she alone, was willing to make it. 
 
J., dissenting). She advocated for a more faithful application of Grutter, claiming that “[t]he 
Court rightly declines to cast off the equal protection framework settled in Grutter . . . . Yet it 
stops short of reaching the conclusion that framework warrants.” Id. 
 122.  See id. at 2433 (“I have several times explained why government actors, including state 
universities, need not be blind to the lingering effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory past,’ the 
legacy of ‘centuries of law-sanctioned inequality.’” (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting))); see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 215 U.S. 200, 273, 
374 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Given this history [of racial discrimination] and its 
practical consequences, Congress surely can conclude that a carefully designed affirmative 
action program may help to realize, finally, the ‘equal protection of the laws’ the Fourteenth 
Amendment has promised since 1868.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1)).  
 123.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Many regions of . . . Texas are still 
predominantly composed of people from a single racial or ethnic group. Because of [this] . . . 
admitting the top 10 percent of all high schools would provide a diverse population and ensure 
that a large, well qualified pool of minority students was admitted to Texas universities.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. at 2433 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 126.  Id. 
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VI. WHAT HAPPENED TO DEFERENCE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM? 
A. The Loose Invocation of Academic Freedom that Began in Bakke 
If the biggest doctrinal casualty in Fisher is the end of deference to 
universities on the question of the need for race-conscious affirmative 
action measures, what caused the demise of that deference? This 
question takes on additional intensity when we consider that in 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and in the Court’s opinion in 
Grutter, this deference was informed by notions of academic 
freedom.127 
One of the most famous lines from Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion 
was his homage to academic freedom. Justice Powell began by stating: 
“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the 
First Amendment.”128 Powell did not actually say, of course, that 
academic freedom was a freestanding constitutional right guaranteed 
in the First Amendment, with distinct content and meaning, different 
from the rights of freedom of speech or freedom of assembly that 
actually are enumerated in the First Amendment. He instead used the 
softer phrase—“special concern of the First Amendment.”129 This 
phrasing paralleled Powell’s jurisprudence in an analogous First 
Amendment arena, in which he joined a majority opinion rejecting 
the claim that journalists enjoyed a special First Amendment 
“reporter’s privilege” to maintain the confidentiality of their 
sources.130 But he also authored a short and cryptic concurring 
opinion131 that some lower courts would interpret as supporting the 
creation of a qualified reporter’s privilege,132 and others would treat as 
meaningless dicta of no formal legal consequence.133 
 
 
 127.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (“The freedom of a 
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student 
body.”); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such 
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
 128.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See Branzburg v. Hayes¸ 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 
F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 133.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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The loose invocation of academic freedom in Bakke as the basis 
for deference to a state university’s decision whether to employ race-
conscious admissions programs came back to haunt affirmative action 
as laid out in Fisher. When the term “academic freedom” is used 
without sufficient legal precision or analytic rigor, it begins to unravel 
as an effective legal construct. In the specific context of affirmative 
action, the loose invocation of academic freedom tends to paper over 
two vexing problems: (1) whether academic freedom is an 
institutional right possessed by universities in their corporate sense, or 
an individual right possessed by individual actors within the university 
community, such as professors and students;134 and (2) whether the 
institutional versus individual conundrum turns on whether the 
matter at issue arises in the context of a public university or a private 
university.135 
B. The Significance of the Dual System of Public and Private Higher 
Education 
The major higher education affirmative action cases decided by 
the Supreme Court—Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and Fisher—all involved 
programs at state universities. Yet the decisions also bind most private 
universities.136 In thinking about the roles of academic freedom and 
deference in the context of affirmative action, it is worth 
reconsidering how this parallelism between public and private 
institutions with regard to affirmative action came about. Indeed, 
looking back over the decades, the failure to account for differences 
between the missions and the sheer sizes of public and private 






 134.  See RODNEY SMOLLA, THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO COLLEGE: FIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 17–38 (2011); 
David Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom 
Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 229 (1990). 
 135.  SMOLLA, supra note 134, at 42–44. 
 136.  Private universities receiving federal funding are bound by the Court’s decisions on the 
constitutionality of affirmative action admission policies because the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
discussed infra, mandates that any organization receiving federal funding may not discriminate 
on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or religion, thereby extending the constraints of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to private parties.  
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In Bakke, Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart,137 reasoned that the Davis 
Medical School admissions program was proscribed by a federal 
statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which declares: “No 
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”138 The four Justices 
joining in the Stevens opinion relied on the legislative history of the 
Act, including remarks from one if its principal proponents, Senator 
Hubert Humphrey, to reach the conclusion that Congress, in passing 
Title VI, intended American universities receiving federal funds to be 
colorblind.139 It may well have been, these Justices reasoned, that the 
proponents of Title VI assumed that the Constitution itself imposed a 
colorblind standard.140 But whether Congress was right or wrong in its 
assumption as to what the Constitution required, Title VI was a law 
standing on its own bottom, imposing a prohibition by its own force, 
and if Congress enacted a colorblind law (even if it did so because it 
felt it had no choice), then Congress had enacted a colorblind law. 
These four Justices thus did not reach the question of whether, under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Medical School’s affirmative action 
program was unconstitutional. Title VI was enough to do the trick.141 
At the other end of the spectrum in Bakke, Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun voted to uphold the Medical School’s 
admissions program.142 Responding to Justice Stevens, they reasoned 
that in passing Title VI, Congress sought only to deny federal money 
to universities that engaged in discrimination that violated the 
Constitution.143 Title VI, in their view, merely mimicked the 
constitutional standard, whatever it might be, and if the Medical 
School program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, by 
definition it did not violate Title VI.144 Then, turning to the 
constitutional issue, those four Justices distinguished between the 
“benign” and “invidious” use of race, holding that benign racial 
 
 137.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).  
 138.  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2013). 
 139.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 415–16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 140.  Id. at 416. 
 141.  Id. at 411–12, 421. 
 142.  Id. at 325–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 143.  Id. at 328. 
 144.  Id. at 353. 
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classifications—those seeking to assist groups that had historically 
been victims of discrimination—should be judged under a more 
lenient “intermediate scrutiny” standard.145 Applying intermediate 
scrutiny, they would have upheld the Medical School program, 
reasoning that government “may take race into account when it acts 
not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages 
cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.”146 
Justice Powell supplied the key fifth vote on this issue—agreeing 
with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackman that Title VI 
and the Constitution were coextensive.147 This was one of the few 
load-bearing legal propositions in Bakke that actually commanded a 
five-Justice majority in the case. And now in 2013, it may be the only 
legal proposition in Bakke that remains, at least for the time being, 
unthreatened as good law.148 Though it might have seemed a 
subordinate point at the time—noisome legal underbrush to be 
cleared away by the five Justices who wanted to reach the weighty 
constitutional question posed by affirmative action—the decision that 
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause are coextensive has 
significant practical consequences for higher education in America, 
putting virtually all public and private universities on the same plane 
when it comes to the use of race in admissions. Only the very rare 
bird—the exceptionally independent school that refuses to accept 
federal aid at all—is out from under the national legal standard. 
Unlike some other aspects relating to the values and identity of 
universities, in which private schools are free to engage in practices 
not permitted for public schools, when it comes to race, one size must 
fit more-or-less all. Private universities, for example, even those 
receiving federal aid, may remain exclusively female, or exclusively 
male, and a few still do.149 And private universities, even those 
receiving federal aid, may choose to be overtly religious in their 
 
 145.  Id. at 359. 
 146.  Id. at 325. 
 147.  Id. at 287 (plurality opinion). 
 148.  See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Salem State Univ., 
No. 11-10748-DJC, 2013 WL 3404331, at *6 (D. Mass. July 2, 2013); Davis v. City of New York, 
No. 10 Civ. 0699(SAS), 2013 WL 1288176, at *21 n.210 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013); Aguirre v. San 
Leandro Police Dep’t, No. 10-04364 CW, 2011 WL 738292, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011). 
 149.  The Supreme Court has yet to address the status of private single-sex education. See 
Respondents' Brief at 35–36, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-
2107) (explaining that “[t]he unconstitutionality of the MUW women-only admissions policy 
invalidated in Hogan does not affect the continued legality of private single-sex education”). 
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mission and programming.150 But when it comes to race and 
affirmative action policies, Bakke held and still holds that public and 
private schools must behave the same. 
This linkage between the admissions programs of private and 
public universities was not merely legal, in the sense that five Justices 
in Bakke used Title VI to create a unifying bridge, putting private and 
public schools on a formal legal par. The linkage went deeper than 
that. Justice Powell held up as a constitutionally approved admissions 
model the lofty ideals behind the admissions programs of elite private 
universities, as exemplars of what the public universities should be 
doing.151 An amicus brief submitted by Columbia University, Harvard 
University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, 
for example, proved to be among the most frequently cited sources in 
Justice Powell’s opinion,152 along with quotations from the President 
of Princeton,153 and a wholesale reproduction of the Harvard 
Admissions program in its Appendix.154 This conflation of public and 
private universities may not have appeared like much at the time—
and indeed, it seemed to go largely unnoticed. With the benefit of 
decades of hindsight, however, it may have been a contributing cause 
to the slow unraveling of the holistic admissions affirmative action 
ideal. 
In accepting the pursuit of diversity as a compelling governmental 
interest, Justice Powell again conflated the world of private 
universities with the world of public universities, treating notions of 
institutional academic freedom as essentially identical for private and 
public schools alike.155 This loose use of the phrase “academic 
freedom” as a justification for judicial deference to the academic 
judgment of educators was, as a strict matter of constitutional 
doctrine, conceptually unsound from the beginning, and would prove, 
as I hope to demonstrate later, to be yet another contributing factor 
to the demise of affirmative action. 
 
 
 150.  See generally Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. 
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
 151.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316–17 (citing Appendix to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard 
University, Stanford University and the University of Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae at 2–3, 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811)). 
 152.  Id. at 317. 
 153.  Id. at 314 n.48. 
 154.  Id. at 321–24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.). 
 155.  See id. at 311–12. 
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At its core, the great conceptual oversight in Justice Powell’s 
invocation of academic freedom in Bakke was his failure to grapple 
with the fundamental constitutional divide between public and 
private actors. It is conceptually coherent to speak of academic 
freedom as a constitutional right possessed by universities as 
institutions if they are private.156 Duke University, a private institution, 
certainly possesses rights of institutional autonomy derived from the 
First Amendment that it may assert against governments—against the 
City of Durham, the State of North Carolina, or the United States. 
Current First Amendment doctrine suggests that these rights are not 
so much distinct, free-standing First Amendment freedoms with 
content over and above Duke’s rights of free speech or association, 
but are instead derivative of those established rights, translations of 
the meaning and application of those rights in the context of private 
higher education.157 Individuals within Duke—professors or students 
on the campus—by contrast, have no First Amendment academic 
freedom rights they may assert against Duke itself, because Duke is 
not a state actor and is not bound by the First Amendment. Though 
Duke faculty and students may well possess some enforceable legal 
entitlements to academic freedom, the legal source of those 
entitlements will essentially derive from the law of contracts, as 
informed by Duke’s key documents (bylaws, regulations, handbooks, 
and the like), practices, and customs.158 
A few miles down the road, at the University of North Carolina, 
the pattern is reversed. Now it becomes incoherent to speak of the 
University of North Carolina as possessing First Amendment rights as 
an institution. This is an issue that has been litigated with special 
intensity in Michigan, in which the question posed was whether 
Michigan’s state universities possessed constitutionally enforceable 
rights against the State of Michigan itself.159 To the extent that such 
rights are described as First Amendment rights enforceable by, say, 
the University of Michigan against the State of Michigan, the claim at 
its core must be unsound. For surely the University of Michigan or the 
 
 156.  SMOLLA, supra note 134, at 42–44. 
 157.  See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. 
Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
 158.  SMOLLA, supra note 134, at 42–44. 
 159.  See Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ., 594 N.W.2d 491, 498 
(Mich. 1999); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ., 431 N.W.2d 
217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 773, 777–78 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988).  
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University of North Carolina, themselves state agencies and creatures 
of their states, cannot have First Amendment rights enforceable 
against the very state entities that created them. Again in contrast to 
the world of private universities, it is sound to treat the individual 
actors at public institutions as possessing constitutional rights, 
including First Amendment rights, which may be asserted against their 
state universities. 
What this discussion reveals is that when a state university, such as 
the University of California, the University of Michigan, or the 
University of Texas, invokes “academic freedom” as a First 
Amendment right to buttress the institution’s defense of affirmative 
action, it is talking legal gibberish. A private university, in contrast, 
could plausibly interpose a First Amendment entitlement to shape its 
own student body as it deems fit as a defense to a federal statute 
interpreted as requiring colorblind admissions. 
To the extent that a state university might assert an entitlement to 
deference by courts regarding its educational judgments, that 
entitlement to deference resides not in the First Amendment, but in 
structural conceptions of separations of powers and federalism. In 
Fisher, for example, the State of Texas as a sovereign within the 
federal system is certainly entitled to some respect and deference in 
deciding for itself how best to shape its state system of higher 
education, including the character and identity of its student bodies.160 
Once that deference is conceptualized as an incident to federalism, 
however, and not the First Amendment, its force is diminished. And 
the force is diminished because of yet another fundamental precept of 
constitutional law—that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment stands as an explicit and powerful constraint 
on federalism and “state’s rights” in all matters germane to 






 160.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). 
 161.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 472 (1989) (“[Section] 1 of the 
Amendment, which includes the Equal Protection Clause, is an explicit constraint upon the 
power of States and political subdivisions, which must undertake any remedial efforts in 
accordance with the dictates of that section.”). 
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Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,162 which was 
placed on the Supreme Court docket for the October 2013 term, will 
test these propositions. Schuette raises the question of whether 
Michigan voters may ban affirmative action in admissions at the 
state’s public universities.163 A deeply divided lower court ruled that 
even though affirmative action in university admissions is presently 
deemed constitutional, but not constitutionally required, the Michigan 
electorate, in adopting a preemptive statewide ban on racial 
preferences in admissions, nonetheless violated equal protection 
principles by removing from state university boards, administrators, 
and faculty the power they traditionally possessed to set admissions 
policies.164 The Supreme Court in Schuette will have the opportunity to 
clarify the principles explored here, including whether a state 
university has any federal constitutional entitlement to resist the 
policy choices imposed upon it by the state itself. 
C. The Role of Size and Scale 
Yet another practical aspect of the conflation of public and private 
universities with regard to affirmative action law and policy is that it 
is indifferent to issues of size and scale. On a simple, pragmatic level, 
when it comes to admissions, size and scale matter. Smaller 
universities, or smaller units within universities (such as law schools), 
have a much easier time implementing a genuinely holistic approach 
to admissions than larger ones. Giant state university systems, or 
individual state university campuses with tens of thousands of 
students, will often feel hydraulic pressure to automate more of the 
admissions process. 
The University of Michigan Law School in Grutter was able to 
make a winning case in the Supreme Court that its approach to 
admissions was sufficiently “Harvard-like” to meet the standard 
Justice Powell had held up as permissible in Bakke.165 The University 
of Michigan undergraduate admissions program, which relied on a 
more mechanical point system for admissions, by contrast looked 
more like a quota—preference of race for its own sake—which Powell 
had found offensive in Bakke.166 But surely the differences in the two 
 
 162.  133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013). 
 163.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 
No. 12-682 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 164.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 165.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003). 
 166.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003). 
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systems at the same University in Ann Arbor were not attributable to 
the Michigan Law School’s superior virtue or understanding of 
constitutional law (notwithstanding that it was the law school). 
Rather, the difference, in large part, was a product of the sheer 
difference in scale—and in turn, the different challenges admissions 
departments face in providing authentically individualized 
consideration to all candidates in the applicant pool of a law school 
versus the applicant pool of a major state undergraduate program. 
Indeed, in Gratz the University of Michigan made exactly this 
argument, claiming that it was simply not practical for it to employ an 
individualized approach to holistic admissions.167 But under Gratz, this 
mere administrative inconvenience is not, as a matter of law, a 
sufficient justification for adopting race-conscious admissions 
programs that would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.168 
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
While the remand ordered by the Supreme Court in Fisher 
proceeds and the Fisher case moves through the next stages of 
litigation, a broader, more figurative “remand” will also proceed, as all 
of us in American higher education consider what we will do if, as the 
analysis above suggests, race-conscious affirmative action programs as 
we have known them are not long for this world.169 
If race-conscious affirmative action programs come to be 
eliminated entirely, or are severely curtailed, does that mean 
American universities should abandon admissions policies that are 
“holistic”? In my view, the answer must be “No!” There are great 
benefits to holistic admissions programs, even when stripped of any 
consideration of race or ethnicity. Our system of higher education, our 
very constitutional democracy, is strengthened by university 
admissions policies that are not single-mindedly driven by academic 
numbers, such as test scores, grade point averages, or Advanced 
 
 167.  Id. at 275. 
 168.  Id. (“[T]he fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing 
individualized consideration might present administrative challenges does not render 
constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”).  
 169.  This introspection may force more transparency with regard to what diversity really 
means in the day-to-day decisionmaking of admissions officials in higher education. See Devon 
Carbardo, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1181–82 (2013) (“When a school says it 
is committed to diversity, few stop to ask precisely what that actually means. . . .  Deference to 
expert decisionmakers is often rational. But should we not have a better sense of what is going 
on behind the closed door of admissions?”). 
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Placement courses. Qualities of character, including leadership, 
altruism, civic engagement, public service, passion for social justice, 
creativity, entrepreneurial spirit, resiliency, drive, ambition, the 
capacity to overcome adversity—all the polymath possibilities that 
might comprise true grit—should also matter. These are factors 
resonant in their connection to our most enduring renditions of the 
American dream.170 If those of us in higher education pick up our 
marbles, leave the game, and pout, abandoning holistic admissions 
because the law evolves to require race-neutral alternatives, we will 
have to ask ourselves, poignantly, who really put the “holes in 
holistic”? 
If time proves me right, and courts do in fact build on Fisher to 
effectively end race-conscious affirmative action programs, we may 
predict a cacophony of shrill critics claiming that the judiciary has 
inflicted on the nation a grievous wound, forcing the premature 
demise of a holistic approach to admissions that has served the 
country passably well, and pragmatically, is still needed. Yet what if 
those of us in higher education were to take a truth serum, and 
engage in our own candid introspective strict scrutiny, asking 
ourselves, who actually caused the demise of the holistic approach? 
Might we not be haunted by the suggestion of Queen Gertrude in 
Hamlet, that it is we who “doth protest too much”?171 Might we not 
reach the troubling judgment that in our often numbers-driven 
obsession to serve the two masters of elevating the objective 
academic credentials of our students and enhancing the statistical 
diversity profiles of our student bodies, when we ask, really, who put 
the holes in holistic, the uncomfortable answer just might be: we did. 
Affirmative action in admissions in American higher education 
may be on its way out in part because the ideal of a genuinely holistic 
approach to admissions has not been matched by the realities of 
admissions programs in practice at many universities. As with so many 
human enterprises, the reality on the ground is not as pure or pleasing 
as the lofty ideal considered as an abstraction. The walk does not 
entirely match the talk. That dissonance has contributed to a gap in 
trust and credibility between many of the leading institutions in 
 
 170.  Rodney Smolla, The Legal Future of Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (June 
27, 2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/06/27/essay-meaning-supreme-court-
ruling-affirmative-action. 
 171.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, l. 179 (W. J. Craig. ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1914) (1600). 
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higher education and leaders in American politics, culture, and, most 
critically for legal purposes, the judiciary. Now we must walk the 
walk—though after Fisher, down a new path. 
I have no doubt that the many superb educators who crafted the 
admissions policies for the University of Texas acted exactly as the 
Fifth Circuit described, with the utmost good faith and with the 
highest hopes for all the students of that great University in their 
pursuit of their dreams. We now know, however, that such good faith 
is not enough, and it will be incumbent on those of us in higher 
education to obey the evolving law of the land, and to craft policies 
that enhance diversity in ways that will remain constitutionally 
permissible—policies sufficiently holistic to continue to provide broad 
access to the promise of the nation’s rich tapestry of public and 
private education. 
 
